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I. 
IMP ACT OF A DUTY TO DEFEND UNDER THE ICRMP POLICY ON 
NORTHLAND'S OBLIGATION TO INDEMNIFY ICRMP 
In its opening brief, ICRMP established the District Court committed legal error by failing 
to address the contractual responsibilities of ICRMP and Northfield outlined in the Northfield 
policy. See ICRMP Brief, pp. 8-16. A central issue in this appeal is, under the .terms of the 
Northfield policy, who is charged with the responsibility of deciding whether a defense was owed 
and once that decision was made, how is Northfield's obligation to indemnify ICRMP for those 
defense costs impacted? 
In its response, Northland argues that ICRMP's "election" to provide a defense had no 
bearing on whether coverage existed under the Northfield policy and had no impact on its 
obligation to indemnify ICRMP. See Response Brief, pp. 21-23. This argument fails to 
appreciate the issues raised in ICRMP's opening brief and it fails to consider, or even discuss, the 
contractual duties the Northfield policy delegated to the ICRMP claims department.1 
Notably absent in Northland's response is any discussion of Section II of the general 
insuring agreement of the Northfield policy. That section is entitled "Service Organization" and it 
~ ~- .fs , ' '---'"<:; ',,. ,..,,-,·;· . •· 
. identifies who is required to make claims management decisions on behalf of Northfield relating 
to the defense and settlement of claims. The relevant section of the policy reads: 
1 Contrary to the argument advanced by Northland, ICRMP did not "elect" to provide a defense. 
As established by Northland's stipulation and the Order entered by the District Court granting 
ICRMP's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ICRMP was legally obligated under the terms of 
the insurance policy purchased by Kootenai County to defend the Paradis litigation. See Tr., 12:7-
13 :7; R.187-188. ICRMP was not acting as a volunteer. It recognized its contractual obligations 
and acted in a manner that was consistent with the ICRMP insurance policy. 
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II. Service Organization 
It is understood that all claims under this policy shall be serviced by ICRMP's 
claims department who shall perform the following duties: 
a. Investigate and .settle or defend all claims or losses - it is understood that, 
when so requested, the ICRMP claims department will afford underwriters an 
opportunity to be associated with them in the defense or control of any claim, 
suit, or proceeding; 
b. Maintenance of accurate records of all details incident to payments. 
c. Furnish monthly claims records on an approved form. 
See R219, Exhibit 4 (Martens Affidavit, Exhibit A, p.5). 
This language is unambiguous. The passage "all claims under this policy" clearly 
references the Northfield policy, not the ICRMP policy. The policy then uses mandatory language 
stating "ICRMP's claims department ... shall perform the following duties:". (emphasis added) 
The duties ICRMP is required to perform is identified as including investigation, defense, and 
settlement of all claims or losses. 
Contrary to Northland's arguments, ICRMP has not suggested the language in the ICRMP 
policy empowered it to bind Northfield regarding claims management decisions. Instead, 
ICRMP's ability to make those decisions was, created by the unambiguous language in the 
Northfield policy which required the ICRMP claims department to service claims under the 
Northfield policy and make decisions concerning whether to defend or settle a particular claim. 
The same language does not allow Northfield or Northland the ability to veto a good faith decision 
to defend and incur defense costs that would implicate Northfield's obligation to indemnify 
ICRMP. 
· Northland is asking this Court to either ignore the plain language of the Northfield poli~y 
or infuse a new term into the contract which would allow it s.econd guess a decision which 
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triggered Northland's duty to indemnify for defense costs years after the decision to incur those 
costs was made by the entity identified in the Northfield policy as being responsible to make the 
decision. This argument violates basic rules of contract interpretation which requires courts to 
consider the agreement as a whole, give meaning to every term, see Daugherty v. Post Falls Hwy. 
Dist., 134 Idaho 731, P3d. 534 (2000), and refrain from including new terms into the contract 
which the parties did not include through their own negotiations. See J.R. Simplot Co. v. 
Chambers, 171, 248, 229 P2d. 977 (1960); Shawyer v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 
354, 93 P3d. 685 (2004). IfNorthland desired to reserve the right to override claims management 
decisions impacting the Northfield policy, it could have included language to the effect in the 
policy. It cannot ask the Court to add policy language intended to create or avoid liability. See 
Anderson v. Tile Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 875, 878-79, 85-86 (1992); Purvus v. Progressive Ins. Co., 
142 Idaho 213,216, 127 P3d. 116, 119 (2005). 
The District Court did not address this aspect of the Northfield policy. Instead, the Court 
reached a factual conclusion that the sole proximate cause of Mr. Paradis' damages was 
inadequate training of Kootenai County employees regarding their obligation to disclose 
exculpatory evidence .under Brady v. M ar;,vland;-173 U.S .. 8 3 ( 1963). The court further concluded 
the inadequate training allegations were limited to the 1980-1981 timeframe. See Rl98. This 
. approach is not only legally wrong, see Sections II and III, infra, it failed to utilize the proper 
standard to scrutinize ICRMP's actions. Rather than engaging in restrictive fact finding aimed to 
defeat coverage, the Court should have addressed the process whereby ICRMP reached its 
decision that an "occurrence" had been pied which caused it to incur defense costs which would 
be reimbursed by Northfield. The focus should have been whether ICRMP' s actions represented a 
good faith exercise of its contractual obligations under the Northfield policy. The District Court 
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did not engage in this analysis as it failed to consider the contractual relationship between the 
parties or the legal duties the Northfield policy imposed upon ICRMP. 
Northland attempts to ignore the terms of the Northfield policy by arguing it did not owe a 
duty to defend the Paradis lawsuit and, for that reason, the Court's rulings governing when a duty 
to defend arises have no application. See Response Brief, p. 30. The flaw in this approach is 
revealed by the Northfield policy language. The policy requires Northfield to indemnify ICRMP 
" ... for all sums, including expenses, as more fully defined by the term ultimate net loss, which the 
assured [ICRMP] shall become legally obligated to pay as damages imposed by law ... ". 
(emphasis added) .. See R219, Exhibit 4 (Martens Affidavit, Exhibit A, p. 13). The Northfield 
policy defines ultimate net loss to include" ... the total sum which the assured [ICRMP] becomes 
obligated to pay by reason of personal injury or property damage claims ... "including "law costs 
... expenses for lawyers and investigators and other persons for litigation, settlement, adjustment 
and investigation of claims or suits which are paid as a consequence of any occurrence covered 
hereunder." Id (Martens Affidavit, Exhibit A, p. 40). 
This language establishes that when ICRMP became obligated to provide a defense to its 
insured for a claim that described an<eocurmnce under the Northfield policy, the assured, ICR.MP;"" 
was entitled to indemnity. The validity of the decision to incur defense costs is governed by this 
Court's rulings establishing when an insurer's duty to defend arises. Based upon the legal 
standard outlined in Kootenai County v. Western Casualty, 113 Idaho 908, 750 P2d. 87 (1988) 
and Hoyle v. UticaMut. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 367, 48 P3d. 1256 (2002). ICRMPbecame liable or 
"legally obligated" to its insureds for defense costs "imposed by law". As outlined in Section II, 
infra, the Paradis liability complaints described potentially covered claims. Because of those 
allegations, ICRMP became obligated to incur defense costs. The Northfield policy clearly covers 
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these expenses through its definition of the term "ultimate net loss". ICRMP could not become 
legally obligated to provide a defense to the Kootenai County insureds unless a duty to defend 
under the I CRMP policy arose.. Provided the allegations in the liability complaint potentially 
described a claim that could be considered an "occurrence" as that term is defined by the 
Northfield policy, ICRMP was entitled to indemnity for those defense costs. 
A. Northfield Was ICRMP's Reinsurer. 
In its response, Northland attempts to argue it was not ICRMP's reinsurer. See Response 
Brief, pp. 24-29. Northland's argument is based upon the alleged lack of a follow the forms 
clause or a follow the settlements clause in the Northfield policy that is commonly found in 
reinsurance policies. According to Northland, absent these contractual terms, the policy cannot be 
considered reinsurance. It characterizes the policy it sold to ICRMP as "secondary insurance" 
citing Northland Ins. Co. v. Montana Assoc. of Counties, 30 I Montana 472, 10 P3d. 813 (2000). 
The Montana Assoc. of Counties case provides no guidance as the reported case fails to 
set out the language of the policy purchased by the insured. Based upon this record, one cannot 
know if the Northland policy at issue in that case was similar to. the policy purchased by ICRMP. 
Wha~ is known from the la,143µage.,in the policy that was sold to ICRMP is that Northland 
unambiguously described ICRMP as its "Named Reinsured". See R219, Exhibit 4 (Martens 
Affidavit, Exhibit A, p. I). It cannot be seriously disputed that describing an insured as the 
"Named Reinsured" evidences an intent on the part of Northfield to sell ICRMP reinsurance. 
Clearly, ICRMP understood it was, and had been for many years, purchasing reinsurance. See 
R219, Exhibit 12 (Ferguson Affidavit, i\2). ICRMP's understanding and its expectations were 
reasonable in light of the general principle that reinsurance is intended to transfer all, or a portion 
of a risk an insurer such as ICRMP underwrites to ahother insurer such as Northland. See 
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Colonial American Life Ins. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 491 U.S. 244 (! 989). See 
also Kemper Reinsurance Co. v. Cochran (In Re: Midland Ins. Co.) 79 NY2d. 253, 590 NE2d. 
1186 ( 1992) (identifying the purpose of reinsurance is its function as a mechanism for the 
reallocation of risk from the insurer that originally underwrites a risk to another insurer). 
Northland's reliance upon the lack of a follow the forms clause in the Northfield policy 
ignores the fact that Mr.- Paradis was seeking damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by 
negligence, false imprisonment, defamation, malicious prosecution, violations of civil rights, and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. These are causes of action which are identified in both 
the ICRMP and the Northfield policies as covered claims. See R2 l 9, Exhibits 2 and 4 (McHenry 
Affidavit, Exhibit 1, pp. 14-15, Coverages A and B, Definitions 118 and 9; Martens Affidavit, 
Exhibit A, pp. 6 and 13, 11A and C, p. 14, 11 ). Additionally, it is undisputed that both the ICRMP 
and the Northfield policies contained very similar definitions of the term "occurrence". Id. The 
definition of the te1m "occurrence" is the policy language at issue in this case. Therefore, the fact 
a follow the forms clause is not included in the Northfield. policy does not defeat the conclusion 
that the policies have achieved concurrency by extending .coverage for the same risks. 
Additionally, Noa;hland,:.sargument that a follow the settlements clause is a,necessary 
component of a reinsurance contract is mistaken. In Aetna Cas. And Surety. Co. v. Home Ins. 
Co., 882 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), the court recognized that the "follow the fortunes" 
doctrine arises by operation of law, even in the absence of a loss settlements clause in the 
reinsurance contract. Under the follow the fortunes doctrine, reinsurers such as Northland are 
required to honor the good faith settlement decisions of its reinsured provided the ceding insurer 
(ICRMP) decision to defend or settle is at least arguably within the scope of the insurance 
coverage that was reinsured. See Mentor Ins. Co. Ji. Norges Brannkasse, 996 F2d. 506, 517 (2d 
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Cir. 1993). See also International Surplus Ins. v. Underwriters at Lloyd, 68 F. Supp. 917,920 
(S.D. OH. 1994) (reinsurer bound by the "follow the fortunes" doctrine even in the absence of 
explicit language in the reinsurance contract). 
Here, the Northfield policy does contain a loss settlements clause. As outlined above, the 
Northfield policy identifies the ICRMP claims department as the entity charged with the 
responsibility and duty of making decisions concerning the settlement of all claims covered by the 
Northfield policy. This language is consistent with the follow the fortines doctrine as it empowers 
ICRMP to make claims handling decisions which are binding upon Northfield so long as those 
decisions are undertaken in good faith and are arguably within the scope of the coverage provided 
by the Northfield policy. Contrary to the arguments ofNorthland, the policy it sold to ICRMP is 
an indemnity reinsurance agreement. It is contractually obligated to indemnify ICRMP for 
payments, which include settlement and defense costs, that were reasonably within the terms of 
the ICRMP and Northfield policies. See Christiania General Ins. Corp. v. Great American Ins. 
Co., 979 F2d. 268 (2d. Cir. 1992). As outlined above, the District Court failed to appreciate the 
contractual relationship between ICRMP and Northland. This caused the District Court to 
erroneously rule thaJ.eovern.ge did not exist. 
II. 
NORTHLAND ASKS THIS COURT TO IGNORE THE ACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN 
THE PARADIS PLEADINGS TO CONCLUDE COVERAGE DOES NOT EXIST 
Throughout the Northland brief, it is argued that coverage does not exist under the 
Northfield policy as the Paradis complaints alleged a failure to train which it argues occurred only 
in the early 1980s was the sole cause of Mr. Paradis' alleged wrongful incarceration. In its brief, 
Northland summarizes, without referencing the actual language in first Paradis Complaint as 
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follows: 
Counts I and II against Kootenai County are not covered as they are 
civil rights claims wherein the alleged wrongful acts - failure to 
train - resulted in Mr. Paradis' incarceration in 1981, almost 20 
years prior to the commencement of coverage under the Northfield 
policy. See, e.g., Western Casualty, l 13 Idaho at 9l5;North River 
Ins. Co., 428 F. Supp. 2d. at 1288-92. Additionally, Count II 
explicitly only alleges acts in 1980 and 1981. 
See Respondent's Brief, p. 25. 
The Amended Complaint is also sununarized as follows: 
Counts I, II, and III against Walker and Kootenai County are not 
covered as they are § I 983 claims ( discussed above) wherein the 
alleged wrongful acts - failure to train - resulted in Mr. Paradis' 
incarceration in 1981, almost 20 years prior to the commencement 
of coverage under the Northfield policy. See, e.g. Western 
Casualty, 113 Idaho at 915; North River Ins. Co., 428 F. Supp. 2. 
at 1288-92. Additionally, Counts II and III explicitly only allege 
acts in 1980 and 1981 (pages 20-25); even ICRMP did not consider 
these claims covered. 
See Respondent's Brief, pp. 36-37. 
If one simply accepted Northland's summary and did not actually read the Paradis 
pleadings, respondent's argument would have some appeal. However, Northland' s sununarization 
omits criticaI,.f;,.ctua!Ja,Jlegatioµs that trigger coverage under both the ICfilvfP and the Northfield 
policies. 
Contrary to Northland's characterization, Mr. Paradis did not limit his allegations of 
inadequate training to the 1980-1981 timeframe. The original Complaint, at ,I68, alleges that 
County employees were violating the Brady doctrine " .. .in 1980 and 1981 - and - indeed 
continuing for years thereafter - the customs, policies, and practices of Kootenai County, 
particularly those of its prosecuting attorney and sheriff, displayed and reflected a deliberate 
indifference to and conscious disregard for the constitutional rights of criminal defendants 
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generally, and the plaintiff in particular." (emphasis added) R3I. By this allegation, Paradis 
contended the Kootenai County defendants were engaged in illegal activities that violated his civil 
rights throughout his incarceration. He was also alleging that the defendants' actions constituted 
. negligent infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment. See R2 l 9, Exhibit 2 (McHenry 
Affidavit, Exhibit 2; Complaint, Counts V and VI).2 
The Amended Complaint elaborates upon the ongomg civil rights allegations by 
specifically stating the obligation of Kootenai County and the individual defendants to disclose 
exculpatory evidence " .. .is a continuing duty and does not cease with the conviction and 
incarceration of the criminal defendant." See R219, Exhibit 2 (McHenry Affidavit, Exhibit 5, 
if92). Paradis then alleged the defendants failure to comply with this ongoing duty violated his 
constitutional rights causing him to suffer emotional distress throughout his incarceration. Id. 
(Exhibit 5, ifif97 and l O 1 ). The same allegations were restated as violations of state law 
constituting negligence and false imprisonment on the part of the prosecutor and Kootenai County. 
Id. (McHenry Affidavit, Exhibit 5, ifl 82)., 
Northland's summaries are a restrictive reading of the liability complaints intended to 
defeat co'<:erage. This approach is inconsistent with the well-established legal standard which.. ·· """"'" he., 
governs the determination of when a duty to defend arises. An insurer is required to read the 
allegations in the liability complaint broadly, i.e. in favor of coverage, and then compare those 
allegations against potential coverages in the insurance policy. If a potential for coverage exists, a 
duty to defend attaches. See County of Kootenai v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 113 Idaho 
2 Contrary to the argument of Northland, both the ICRMP and the Northfield policies in the 
general liability and the law enforcement liability insuring agreements through their definition of 
the term "personal injury" provide coverage for false imprisonment claims. See R219, Exhibits 2 
and 4 (McHenry Affidavit, Exhibit 1, pp. 14-15; Martins Affidavit, Exhibit A, p. 14, if!). 
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908, 910, 750 P2d. 87, 89 (1988); Hoyle v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 367, 372, 48 P3d. 
1256, 1261 (2002). 
Mr. Paradis' factual allegations were hotly contested. Kootenai County and the individual 
defendants took the position his allegations were false. However, contrary to the position taken by 
.Northland, the fact that legal or factual allegations in a liability complaint are false, or even 
frivolously pled, has no bearing on an insurance company's obligation to provide coverage to its 
insured. See Blackv. Firemens Fund Am. Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 449, 767 P2d. 824 (!989)(dutyto 
defend existing so long as time is a dispute over facts bearing on coverage). In order to determine 
whether potential coverage existed, the allegations in the liability complaints must be read for the 
proposition of alleging that Kootenai County and its existing and former employees engaged in a 
pattern of ongoing tortious and unconstitutional activity beginning in 1980, continuing until Mr. 
Paradis was released from prison. Any other approach would allow an insurance company to read 
the allegations in the liability complaint in a restrictive manner with the intent of defeating 
coverage. If this approach was adopted, it would require this Court to overrule a pattern of very 
consistent case law beginning with County of Kootenai County v. Western Casualty & Surety, 
supm. The District:Court mistakenly accepted Northland' s mi-scharacterization of the Paradis , "'-'' ·· 
complaints which caused it to erroneously conclude that coverage under the Northfield policy did 
not exist. 
Ill. 
THE CONTINUING TORTS ALLEGED IN THE PARADIS COMPLAINTS ARE 
OCCURRENCES UNDER BOTH THE ICRMP AND NORTHFIELD POLICIES 
In its response, Northland does not suggest that claims alleging negligence, false 
.. imprisonment, malicious prosecution, defamation, infliction of emotional distress, or violations of 
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civil rights are not potentially covered claims under the Northfield policy. Any argument to the 
contrary would be inconsistent with the Northfield policy which clearly extends coverage for these 
claims. See R219, Exhibit 4 (Martens Affidavit, Exhibit A, p. 13, 11A and C; p. 14, 11. Instead, 
Northland's denial of coverage was based largely upon its position that the Paradis complaints 
· failed to describe an occurrence as that term is defined by the Northfield policy. See R00S-057. 
In ICRMP's opening brief, it was established that a number of the negligence and civil 
rights claims described in the Paradis complaints were continuing torts. See Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 27-35. The ICRMP claims department made the determination that coverage potentially 
existed under both the Northfield and ICRMP policies because the Paradis complaints described 
either continuing torts or torts that took place during the time ICRMP was reinsured by Northland. 
See R61; see also R219, Exhibit 2 (McHenry Affidavit, 18, Exhibit 3). 
Rather than take the questionable action of suing its insureds through a declaratory 
judgment action, ICRMP defended the case and challenged the plaintiff's claims through motions 
to dismiss. 3 Those motions were based upon the application of the statute oflimitations and the 
timing of the plaintiff's notice of claim. See R219, Exhibit 2 (McHenry Affidavit, 19, Exhibit 4 ). 
• , , ",,The motions were predicated upon the lack of a continuJng tort .. , However, Judge WinrniH ,~ · 
disagreed concluding the Paradis complaint described continuing torts and that, at least some of 
the causes of action did not accrue until the date of the plaintiff's release from prison. Id (Exhibit 
3 In Country Ins. Co. v. Agricultural Development, Inc., I 07 Idaho 961,695 P2d. 346 (1984), the 
court prohibited an insurance company from filing a declaratory judgment action which forces its 
insured to take a factual position to defend the declaratory judgment action which is inconsistent 
with, and prejudices the defense of the liability case. In those situations, the declaratory judgment 
action must await the resolution of the liability case. Here, a declaratory judgment action would 
have forced the Kootenai County insureds to argue the Paradis complaints alleged continuing 
torts, a position which would have been inconsistent with the motions to dismiss filed in the 
liability case. 
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4, pp. 42-46). 
The resolution of the motions to dismiss shows ICRMP's good faith efforts to meet its 
contractual obligations to not only its insured, but to Northland. Rather than become involved in a 
questionable lawsuit with Kootenai County, ICRMP recognized the prudence of litigating the 
question of whether continuing torts had been alleged through the motions to dismiss. If the trial 
court had agreed with arguments ICRMP advanced on behalf of its insureds Mr. Paradis' 
complaint would have been dismissed. However, the fact remains, Judge Winmill concluded 
continuing torts had been alleged and, for that reason, the lawsuit proceeded. Rather than ignore 
Judge Winmill' s ruling, ICRMP recognized the pleadings had been examined by the federal court, 
found to allege claims that were potentially covered, and continued to defend the case. 
In its brief, Northland attempts to avoid the ruling of Judge Winrnill by citing Kootenai 
County v. Western Casualty & Surety, supra. See Respondent's Brief, p. 31-32. The legal issues 
in the Kootenai County case did not involve a continuing tort or the legal question of whether a 
continuing tort is an occurrence under a general liability insurance policy. In Kootenai County, 
the tortious actions of the sheriff began and ended with the disputed sheriffs sale. See I 13 Idaho 
· · ·. · ··"',· .· at 915. The plaintiffs damages continued to accrue after the tortious acts of the sheriff,;mded,•, 
The fact damages were experienced during the policy period did not trigger coverage. Id What 
Kootenai County did not address, because it was not an issue under the facts of that case, is 
whether a continuing tort that takes place, in part, during an insurer's policy period triggers 
coverage. This is the legal issue which the District Court in this case failed to address. 
The Northfield policy defines an occurrence as" ... a continuous or repeated exposure to 
conditions which result in personal injury or damage to property during the policy period. All 
personal injuries to one or more persons and/or property damage arising out of an accident or 
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happening or event or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions shall be deemed to be one . 
occurrence." See R2 l 9, Exhibit 4 (Martins Affidavit, Exhibit A, p. 6). In the liability complaints, 
Paradis alleged that from 1980 until his release from prison in 2001, he was subjected to ongoing 
tortious and unconstitutional conduct by Kootenai County and its existing and former employees 
which caused him to suffer personal injuries. These allegations do not suggest a single act that 
occurred in 1980 or 1981 caused his personal injuries. Instead, consistent with the ruling of Judge 
Winmill, Paradis alleged the tortious and unconstitutional actions of the Kootenai County 
defendants occurred throughout the 1980's and l 990's and did not end until he was released from 
prison. 
In State of Idaho v. The Bunker Hill Co., 647 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Idaho 1986),BunkerHill 
was insured by various insurance companies during the time it was allegedly discharging 
pollutants causing property damage. One of the insurers, Continental, argued it did not owe a 
defense or indemnity because the pollution releases that occurred during its policy period did not 
cause damage until after the policies had expired. See 647 F. Supp. at 1069. This argument was 
rejected with the court concluding the Amended Complaint sought damages for injuries caused by 
· :?c,c ·,··:· tortious conduct thatoccurred during the timethe.-Gontinental policies were in existei!iv'e. Because 
the complaint described a potentially covered claim, coverage existed. Id at 1070. 
A similar conclusion is warranted in this case. The Paradis complaints allege tortious and 
unconstitutional actions which caused injuries throughout the 1980s continuing until he was 
release from prison in 2001. The fact some of the tortious acts or injuries may have occurred prior 
to the time Northland insured ICRMP does not defeat coverage. The focus, for purposes of 
. coverage, is whether the Paradis complaints describe tortious or unconstitutional actions on the 
part of the Kootenai County insureds which occurred during the time ICRMP was insured by 
APPELLANT IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
UNDERWRITER'S REPLY BRIEF - 13 
Northland which caused at least some of the plaintiffs injuries. 
In its response, Northland does not contest the proposition that continuing torts, which can 
take place over many years, should be treated as occurrences under general liability policies. In its 
initial brief, ICRMP cited the Court to case law which has addressed this issue in differing factual 
scenarios. See Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. ofNorthAmerica, 667 F2d. 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Nat'! 
Casualty Ins Co. v. City of Mt. Vernon, 515 NYS2d. 267 (1987); Dioceses of Winona v. 
Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 89 F3d. 1386 (8th Cir. 1996). In each of these cases, the courts 
concluded that where a continuing tort takes place, at least in part, during an insurer's policy 
period coverage under that policy is triggered. Northland does not take issue with this 
proposition. Instead, Northland argues the Paradis complaints describe a single act that occurred 
in 1980 or 1981 which caused Mr. Paradis to suffer ongoing damages. As outlined above, the 
flaw in this argument is revealed by reading the Paradis complaints and the ruling of Judge 
Winmill. The liability complaints alleged tortious conduct was occurring during the time ICRMP 
was insured by Northland. In Idaho, a continuing tort does not exist unless there is ongoing 
tortious activity which has caused the plaintiff to suffer damages. See Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 
" •· . 5 9 8, 8 5 0 P2d. 7 49 ( 1993 ). Judge Winmill -reoognized this standard by citing (S'm'tis wFirth when 
he concluded continuing torts had been alleged. See R2 l 9, Exhibit 2 (McHenry Affidavit, Exhibit 
4, pp. 44-45). 
Although ICRMP may have disagreed with Judge Winmill's ruling, once the motions to 
dismiss were resolved, the company was in possession of a court ruling that had reached the 
conclusion that the Paradis complaints described continuing torts. Northland discounted the 
importance of this ruling by acknowledging the Paradis claims constituted continuing torts, but 
advising ICRMP it felt the Court's ruling was not binding or of any significance to the coverage 
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issues because "Insurance law is governed by state insurance contract law, not federal law. The · 
statute of limitations principles do not guide determination of when a tort or an occurrence takes 
. place for insurance coverage purposes." See R064. This response demonstrates Northland's 
miscomprehension of its contractual obligations under the Northfield policy. Contrary to 
Northland's belief, Judge Winmill's ruling that a continuing tort had been afleged was not based. 
upon federal law. The Court's ruling was an application of state tort law. More importantly, 
Judge Winmill's ruling was a judicial determination that the Paradis complaint alleged continuing 
torts. This is a ruling impacting both the application of the statute of limitations and whether the 
complaint described an occurrence. A necessary component of Judge Winmill's ruling was the 
existence of allegations that ongoing tortious or unconstitutional activity had taken place 
throughout Mr. Paradis' incarceration which would include the timeframe ICRMP was insured by 
Northland. Northland incorrectly assumes that an insurer can chose to ignore rulings by a trial 
court in the underlying liability case that are based upon findings that impact coverage. ICRMP 
recognized the importance of Judge Winmill's ruling on the coverage issues and continued to 
defend the case. 
The District Court erred whem it failed to consider or even dfa1,uss thtdmpact .of Judge 
Winmill' s ruling in the liability case and further erred by failing to address the impact of an 
allegation of a continuing tort on the question of coverage. 
IV. 
NORTHLAND MUST REIMBURSE ICRMP FOR THE FULL AMOUNT OF THE 
PARADIS SETTLEMENT 
In Northland's response, it is suggested that despite its breach of contract it is still allowed 
to contest and litigate whether it is required to reimburse ICRMP for the Paradis settlement. 
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ICRMP does not dispute the proposition that Northland's obligation to indemnify is predicated 
upon the conclusion that it breached its contract with ICRMP. However, once the breach of 
contract is .established, Northland is not allowed to relitigate ICRMP's decision to settle, or 
contest the amount of the settlement, provided the settlement was reasonable. This issue was 
addressed in Exterovich v. Burress, 139 Idaho 439, 80 P3d. 1040 (2003) where this court wrote: 
If the insurer breaches its duty to defend and the insured settles a 
claim covered by the policy, the insurer has a duty to indemnify its 
insured for the amount of that settlement so long as a potential 
liability for the insured existed which resulted in a reasonable 
settlement in view of the size of possible recovery and the 
probability of the claimant's success against the insured. 
See 139 Idaho at 441 ( emphasis added). 
For the reasons outlined above, the Paradis complaints describe claims that potentially fell 
within the coverages of both the ICRMP and Northfield policies. That fact, coupled with 
ICRMP's obligation to make claims handling decisions under the Northfield policy regarding 
whether to defend or settle a claim establishes that Northland's decision to deny coverage and 
refuse to participate in the mediation process was clearly a breach of the insurance policy. 
Northland's reliance upon the recent case of Deluna v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2009 Ida 
Lexis 134 (July 1, 2008), does not change this conclusion or offer it protection from liability. In 
Deluna, the court recognized that an insurer is liable to its insured for contract damages 
surrounding its contractual breach. In Deluna, the resolution of the liability case resulted in a 
finding that the insured was liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress, but that the 
plaintiffs injuries were caused by her contraction of herpes from the insured which was not a 
business related claim. The lack of any business relationship between the plaintiffs damages and 
the insured's negligent conduct.was determinative of the coverage issue .. Because the liability 
APPELLANT IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
UNDERWRITER'S REPLY BRIEF - 16 
case resolved a factual issue that lead to the conclusion State Farm was not required to indemnify 
its insured for the judgment. The court ruled the insurer's refusal to continue with the defense was 
a breach of contract. Because the insured acted as bis own attorney, he could not prove any 
damages. However, if the insured had hired an attorney and incurred defense costs, State Farm 
would have been liable for those costs despite the fact it was ultimately determined that coverage 
did not exist. See Hirst v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., I 06 Idaho 792, 683 P2d. 440 (Ct. 
App. 1984). 
The Deluna case does not stand for the proposition that an insurance company, such as 
Northland, can breach its policy, force its insured to seek a settlement and, thereafter, litigate the 
decision of whether a settlement should have been pursued. In Deluna, the facts which controlled 
the coverage question were resolved through the underlying liability case. In contrast, in this case 
the only fact resolved in the liability case was the existence of continuing torts which was a 
finding that favored coverage. In Exterovich v. Burress, this court ruled that once the insurer 
breached its duty to defend, it is bound by any settlement reached by the insured provided the 
liability complaint described a potentially covered claim which created a possibility ofliability for 
the insured. 
In this case, as recognized by the ICRMP Claims Manager, Rick Ferguson, if the Paradis 
case had been tried and liability found, it was entirely possible the jury's verdict would be limited 
to non-covered claims. See R219, Exhibit 12, ,r9. However, it was equally possible that liability 
could have been found for causes of action which described covered claims. Northland cannot, at 
this stage, litigate the issue of whether Kootenai County would have been found liable or whether 
liability would have been apportioned to covered or non-covered claims. Additionally, Northland 
cannot question any agreement between ICRMP and Kootenai County concerning the County's 
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contribution to settlement.· The decision to mediate was reasonable as was the amount of the 
settlement that was ultimately paid. For that reason, and in consideration of its existing breach of 
contract, Northland is obligated to reimburse ICR.J\.1P for the Paradis settlement. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order 
granting Northland's Motion for Summary Judgment should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of August, 2008. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
By ~-1 C--<0 012.,,. 
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